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Homeland Security: Intelligence Indications and Warning 
By guest analyst Lt. Col Kenneth A. Luikart, USAF. Lieutenant Colonel Luikart is 
the air intelligence officer for the 165th Airlift Wing, Georgia Air National Guard. 
Colonel Luikart served 18 months in Vietnam; supported Operation TEAM SPIRIT 
in Korea; Operation BADGE TORCH in Thailand; Operations CORONET OAK 
and VOLANT OAK in Panama, providing intelligence support to anti-drug 
trafficking missions in Central and South America. He supported Operations 
PROVIDE PROMISE, JOINT ENDEAVOR, and JOINT FORGE, flying important 
airlift missions into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Colonel Luikart supported Operation 
SUPPORT HOPE, flying humanitarian missions into Rwanda and Zaire; and the 
1996 Summer Olympic Games, where he supported the State Olympic Law 
Enforcement Command as the Senior Air Intelligence Liaison Officer for Task 
Force 165. 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
December 2, 2002 
September 11, 2001 demonstrated that policy makers and intelligence organizations had conducted 
business in traditional ways, not in response to today's threats to our nation. The attacks in September 
suggest that inadequate information sharing between law enforcement and national intelligence agencies 
led to lost opportunities to thwart the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda. Little has yet been done to fix many 
of these problems. The nation has failed to formulate significant changes in the way it tasks, collects, 
analyzes, produces and disseminates intelligence information. The architecture needed to provide 
intelligence for homeland defense has not yet emerged. The September 11 attacks are a "watershed 
event" that should change our current intelligence organization, perhaps resulting in legislation as 
important as the National Security Act of 1947.[1]  
Intelligence is the Analytical Spin on Information 
Most experts in the intelligence field agree that intelligence is the analytical spin put on information and 
the ability to communicate this information to policymakers who can put it to good use. David Khan, in his 
book The Code Breakers, notes, "Intelligence faces two all-encompassing, never-ending problems. Both 
are ultimately unsolvable. The first problem is how to foretell what is going to happen." The second 
problem, "as old as mankind," is "how to get statesmen and generals to accept information that they do 
not like."[2] In 1992, before the Senate Intelligence Committee, General Paul Gorman, U.S. Army (Ret) 
explained, "intelligence remains information, no matter how adroitly collected, and no matter how well 
analyzed, until it is lodged between the ears of a decision maker."[3] Gorman went on to say that 
intelligence dissemination is often at fault when our nation, or our commanders in the field, suffers a 
strategic surprise. Intelligence for homeland security thus poses a special challenge because it requires 
the collection of data from non-traditional sources (e.g., state and local law enforcement agencies) to 
create all source analysis to head off homeland security threats. 
Redefining the Threat to the United States 
Prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, most intelligence agencies focused on Moscow. Since then, 
policy makers and intelligence analysts have struggled with redefining the threat faced by the United 
States. Today intelligence and law enforcement agencies confront a world that has many "targets" and a 
vast amount of information and misinformation, some of it transmitted by new means of communication 
(e.g., the Internet). Today's severe threat list is long and growing. 
Major Threats to the United States 
1. Foreign Armed Forces Threat  
2. Economic Espionage  
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction  
o Nuclear and Radiological  
o Chemical and Biological Weapons  
4. Gray Area Phenomena Threat  
o Terrorist Organizations  
o Rogue States  
o Illicit Drug Trade and Narco-Terrorists  
These new threats will force intelligence organizations to rethink their traditional analytical agenda. 
Threat Reports Produced in the Early 1990's 
35% = Defense intelligence including international arms trade and nuclear proliferation 
15% = Defense intelligence surveillance of foreign conflicts and insurgency 
20% = Intelligence on terrorism 
10% = Intelligence on foreign states' internal politics, general foreign policies, internal 
economies and international economic policies 
10% = Tactical support to diplomacy and other international negotiations of all kinds, including 
economic 
10% = Counter-intelligence, counter-espionage and residual security intelligence subjects; 
other miscellaneous subjects like narcotics and international crime 
Source: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power In Peace and War, Cambridge: University Press, 
1996, p. 46. 
 
Several factors, however, complicate the process of redefining the threat and reorganizing to meet it. For 
instance, there are differences in perception that divide policy makers and intelligence analysts. 
According to Glenn P. Hastedt, policy makers expect that information always will be accurate and that 
threat information will be "self-interpreting." By contrast, intelligence analysts use estimative processes to 
create intelligence analyses. Thus they artificially create the future by selecting starting assumptions and 
then creating interpretative and predictive scenarios.[4] Walter Laqueur explains that intelligence "does 
not exist in a vacuum, even if its practitioners sometimes tend to forget this." If the users of the 
intelligence product, the President and senior policy makers, do not trust the validity of the assessment, 
then "even excellent intelligence is of little consequence."[5] Policy makers and intelligence analysts will 
have to search for common ground in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical 
process so that warnings of the most fantastic types of terrorist activity can be used to shape policy in 
constructive ways.  
 
One of the most important changes needed in the current intelligence system is to create an opportunity 
for intelligence analysts from different organizations to confront each other and compare notes. This 
would be an outstanding way to compare competing hypotheses in an environment that would force 
analysts to defend and sharpen their judgments and analyses.[6] In the future, law enforcement agencies 
and officials need to be included in this information sharing process. Much critical information is often 
uncovered in routine traffic stops, for instance, that uncover suspicious individuals and contraband. This 
kind of information now has to be brought to the attention of analysts looking at international threats to 
U.S. security. 
Indications and Warning (I&W) for Homeland Security 
To facilitate this competition of analyses and sharing of ideas and information, a new intelligence 
Indications and Warning (I&W) cell should be created in the Executive Branch. The head of I&W should 
also have direct access to senior intelligence officials and the President. It should embody at least four 
attributes to be effective.  
 
First, the I&W cell should have a streamlined organizational structure. Analytical cells do not need a lot of 
management overhead; rather, the management process should be lean and flexible. Too much 
bureaucratic meddling stymies free thinking and leads analysts to look for the "book" answer, or the 
"politically correct" answer, rather than the right answer. Whether the new I&W agency is designed within 
the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Military Intelligence Center, as Admiral Bobby Inman has 
suggested, one thing is apparent, "all warnings would be directly reported to the Director Central 
Intelligence (DCI) as opposed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense."[7] 
The cell should come under the direct control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). 
 
Second, the cell should be located, in a virtual or physical sense, near the policymakers who are 
supposed to respond to terrorist threats. In other words, members of the cell must be close enough to the 
President, the National Security Council and the policy makers to provide all source intelligence analysis, 
long range threats and short range warnings to decision makers in a timely manner. There are several 
reasons for suggesting that members of the I&W cell remain in close contact with senior leaders. Analysts 
get their marching orders from the leadership's Essential Elements of Information (EEIs). EEIs are what 
the leader needs to know about, but does not know. The odds that finished intelligence will be irrelevant 
are increased if the analyst is far removed from the decision maker. The better the analyst is kept aware 
of policymakers' concerns, the better the analyst can support the needs of officials. 
 
Third, I&W should focus on moving information quickly to the officials who can put it to good use. The 
dissemination process is usually where hot intelligence is lost. Experts agree that in almost every 
intelligence failure, the information was there, but the distribution process failed to communicate 
convincing evidence to action officers who could put it to good use. To fix this problem, a "clearing house" 
for intelligence threat analysis, a forum for analysts from all agencies should be developed. Analysts 
could present their hypotheses before analysts from other agencies. Analysts from all agencies could be 
encouraged to staff and use this clearinghouse to test their models and theories of analysis. Results of 
this process then could be disseminated quickly to policymakers. 
 
Fourth, the new I&W organization should have ties to the new Homeland Security Department. It could 
serve as a way to disseminate analytical techniques and products to non-traditional intelligence 
consumers. Law enforcement agencies, for example, might benefit from Order of Battle analysis of 
terrorist organizations. The new Homeland Security Department is struggling to integrate some forty 
departments and the new I&W cell could help integrate the intelligence effort across these different 
agencies. The Homeland Security Department will establish an intelligence distribution capability, but it is 
not clear how information will be disseminated to the Governors, state law enforcement agencies, or 
National Guard Headquarters. New information distribution technology would probably facilitate the 
transmission of intelligence information, but valid I&W will be lost if procedures are not established to 
transmit information quickly to officials who can put it to good use.[8] Real problems arise when one 
considers the situational awareness at the federal level as opposed to situational awareness at the level 
of state government. There is a disconnect between federal programs and the fifty states. Many states 
have an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and their own unique statewide intelligence collection and 
analysis capability. But it is still not clear how these state systems will merge with the Federal effort. This 
might be a job for a new Executive level I&W cell. 
Conclusion 
Intelligence failures are easily identified in retrospect. Most intelligence failures are caused by a 
breakdown in the dissemination of information. Thus I&W for homeland security must be able to reach not 
only the highest levels of government, but also local law enforcement agencies. 
 
While policy makers and intelligence analysts will not always be on the same sheet of music, a good 
analyst can make the policy maker's job easier by providing him or her with the best guess at what hostile 
forces threaten our national objectives. It is important for the policy maker to understand that the analyst 
is guessing. It is even more important for officials to understand that poor analysis results from 
bureaucratic meddling, numerous distractions, and personnel shortages. Budget constraints cannot be 
used as an excuse for not staffing vacant intelligence analyst positions. The information explosion 
requires that all intelligence analytical agencies be fully staffed to handle the sheer volume of data to be 
analyzed. 
 
There needs to be a forum at the top of the foreign and domestic intelligence structure where analysts 
can compare notes and intelligence theories can be tested and defended. The creation of this I&W cell 
will not be easy and the road to intelligence reform will be long and tedious. But, this is the path our nation 
must be prepared to follow if we are to protect ourselves from future threats to national security. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
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